Discourse as Power - India in the NPT
Review Meet
By C Uday Bhaskar
The month long nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Extension Review
Conference (XRC) that concludes May 19 in New York has little to show in
terms of substantive progress on the contentious issue of nuclear weapons
and their relevance in the post-cold war years. The five nuclear weapon
powers only reiterated their ``unequivocal'' commitment to disarmament
-- as mandated in the NPT -- and their reluctance to provide any tangible
time-frame is more a reflection of the geo-political contradictions and
techno-strategic complexities that are embedded in the nuclear issue. Concurrently,
the XRC also has a distinctive Asian and Indian relevance and thus the
talk-shop in New York and the manner in which the narrative is both constructed
and interpreted are matters of import in shaping the Indian nuclear posture.
The NPT entered into force on March 5, 1970 and is often cited as a
central pillar of global stability. Its objectives were to prevent the
spread of nuclear weapons and related technology, to promote co-operation
in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to further the goal of achieving
nuclear disarmament. The treaty has a chequered evolution and paradoxically
none of the objectives have been realised. Yet the hype extols the many
positive attributes of the NPT that in essence reflect the perpetuation
of the perennial great game of power.
Global Stability
Today the packaging that comes with the NPT describes it as a landmark
treaty that has near universal compliance. It merits recall that while
the US, the former USSR and the UK were original signatories among the
states that had acquired nuclear weapons prior to 1970, China and France
came on board the treaty only in 1992. This treaty was extended indefinitely
in 1995 in a manner whose procedural rectitude was itself debatable --
but is a continuation of the adage that power shapes legal norms. The extension
was not without conditions and obligations on the part of the nuclear weapon
states -- the US, Russia, China, France and the UK whose nuclear weapon
status and exclusivity were both enshrined and legitimised by the NPT.
The rhetoric that envelops the XRC is based on two principal assertions,
first -- that the NPT as it exists, is central to global stability and
must be strengthened by seeking universal adherence; and, second, -- the
NWS are acting in good faith as far as disarmament is concerned but the
route they are adopting is one of cautious arms control treaties and mutual
arms reduction. This has become the dominant narrative of post-Cold War
nuclear discourse and the short sound bite is that an inherently discriminatory
arrangement that accords all the privileges to a select few and allows
them to hold the global community hostage to apocalyptic destruction either
by accident or design is the new mantra for global stability. Little or
no mention is allowed to enter the discourse that this is an inherently
dishonourable route of dubious ethical mooring and thus we have a narrative
domain wherein the power compulsion shapes not only the reality-contour
and legal norms but also the theological underpinning.
Diminished Status
But when we contrast what may be termed the virtual power-reality about
the post-Cold War nuclear world with a true ground reality check, the anomalies
and contradictions abound -- these chickens are coming home to roost in
New York. For a start, the centrality of the nuclear weapon in the security
matrix of the major powers has not been reduced at all. On the contrary,
the emphasis on the nuke has only increased. For instance, the revised
NATO Strategic Concept of 1999 noted that ``the supreme guarantee of the
security of the Allies is provided by the strategic nuclear forces of the
Alliance.''
The NATO assertion has led to a predictable response from Moscow which
has long been uneasy with its diminished status in the face of increasing
western military presence on its periphery. It is significant that when
the Russian President, Mr Vladimir Putin, won his election, one of his
first acts was to visit a Russian nuclear city and reiterate the importance
of this capability for Moscow -- and the need to modernise the same. Embedded
in this declaration is the Russian discomfort over the US intention to
test and field a national missile defence (NMD) system -- a project that
will entail amending the 1972 ABM -- anti ballistic missile treaty. The
NMD despite technical misgivings has considerable political support in
the US and has a budget of US $60 billion over the next 25 years. Despite
its public posture of arms reduction, the US has also decided to refurbish
6,000 nuclear warheads as part of an `active reserve' to hedge against
any uncertainties.
Nuclear Nettle But it is the Asian strand that must concern us
the most. The current nuclear developments and blurred truths are the equivalent
of a multiple chess game being played at two levels that are inter-connected
in a non-linear manner. At the primary level is the US-Russia pas de deux
which will no doubt influence the Chinese posture -- over the size of the
arsenals being maintained, their qualitative nature and the ultimate impact
of NMDs per se on Beijing's strategic capabilities. Within Asia, the picture
is even more complex. India and Pakistan post-May 1998 are states with
nuclear weapons -- SNWs -- even if the NPT will not admit them as NWS.
Israel and North Korea continue to be grey states in more ways than one
and their relevance in the regional nuclear discourse cannot be ignored.
The abiding leitmotif here is the pattern of China providing ballistic
missile and nuclear weapon know-how in Asia and encouraging proliferation
for its own strategic reasons.
Thus the mismatch between the virtual reality that will be asserted
by the NWS in New York to assuage their own insecurities and the true post-Cold
War ground reality will be contained in the manner in which the narrative
is shaped and packaged -- a reiteration of the Foucauldian tenet that ultimately
discourse is the power which is to be seized. India would be well advised
to contribute to the New York discourse and not be painted into a corner
as the core of the post-Cold War nuclear nettle.

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