The Tribune
(by G. Parthasarathy)

INDIA has consistently championed the cause of nuclear disarmament for over four decades. Even as we did so, we continuously built up our nuclear potential so that we would be able to defend ourselves against threats to our security. In pursuing these policies we rejected discriminatory treaties like the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and made it clear that in the pursuit of strategic autonomy we would keep our nuclear options open. All five nuclear weapons powers have sought to persuade us to sign the NPT, with the USA being in the forefront of efforts to persuade and even compel us to forego our nuclear option. Successive governments in our country have defied these pressures, with the Vajpayee government taking the logical step of openly declaring the country’s nuclear capabilities and intentions following the Pokhran nuclear tests in 1998. 

The pressure on India to forego its nuclear options has been particularly manifested during the tenure of the Democratic Party Presidents in the USA. President Carter tried unsuccessfully to persuade the Morarji Desai government to accept full scope safeguards on our nuclear installations and give up our nuclear options. The Clinton administration has adopted a policy of relentless pressure on India for the past eight years to “cap, roll back and eliminate” our nuclear weapons capability. Its zeal to pressurise us to join the CTBT and the FMCT remains an integral part of this effort. It is true that there has been a remarkable improvement in the climate of our relations with the USA in the recent past, especially in the wake of President Clinton’s visit to the subcontinent. But the USA will have to understand that while we seek a growing strategic partnership based on shared values with them, there can be no compromise on our basic national security interests. 

One would have hoped that with the end of the Cold War, the necessity for countries to use nuclear weapons would end. This has regretfully not happened. The US Doctrine of 1993 on Joint Nuclear Operations explicitly envisages the use of nuclear weapons by Washington in “regional contingencies”. In order to maintain overwhelming nuclear superiority the USA has embarked on programmes like the Stockpile Stewardship Programme and the Accelerated Strategic Computing Initiative in which over $ 4 billion is to be invested to enhance the sophistication and reliability of its nuclear arsenal. The USA has ensured that the provisions of the CTBT are such that it can test the reliability of its nuclear weapons at “sub-critical” levels. The CTBT is, therefore, certainly not “Comprehensive” in banning nuclear tests as its title suggests. 

The other nuclear weapons powers have not hesitated to follow the US lead. A recent French White Paper on Defence has recommended that the existing deterrent should be enhanced. Britain has argued that a valid case could be made for using nuclear weapons against warships at sea and sparsely populated areas. The NATO Doctrine clearly envisages the use of nuclear weapons even in conflicts outside the European theatre. Russia has revoked its adherence to a no-first-use doctrine — a doctrine that was the central theme of Soviet strategic thinking. Finally, Israel has implicitly made it clear that it would not hesitate to use nuclear weapons if it became necessary for its survival. 

The strategic scenario closer to home has become even more delicate in recent years. After denouncing the NPT as an instrument of hegemony, China acceded to the treaty. It has, however, retained the option to use nuclear weapons against countries like India that are not signatories to the treaty. More importantly, it has provided assistance to Pakistan in developing that country’s nuclear and missile programmes in a manner that violates the very basic provisions of international covenants like the NPT and the MTCR. It is now well established that it was largely because it had assembled nuclear weapons of Chinese design that Pakistan was able to indirectly hold out the threat of use of nuclear weapons against India when tensions arose during the course of Operation Brass Tacks in 1987. According to officials in the Bush Administration, the same scenario was repeated in 1990. Within two years of the fence-mending visit of Rajiv Gandhi to China, the Chinese commenced the supply of nuclear capable M-11 missiles to Pakistan. There is now little doubt that the Shaheen missiles being assembled in Pakistan are also of Chinese origin. Interestingly, even as the Clinton Administration sought to “cap, roll back and eliminate” India’s nuclear and missile programmes it deliberately covered up and obfuscated the implications and extent of the Sino-Pak nexus in the nuclear and missile fields. 

Both India and Pakistan are known to have possessed nuclear weapons for over a decade when the May, 1998, tests were carried out. The Chairman of India’s Atomic Energy Commission recently revealed that of the five nuclear tests carried out in May, 1998, only one was of an actual nuclear weapon that had been in our possession for a few years. The other tests, including the thermonuclear test, were of weaponisable devices. While Dr Chidambaram claimed that the tests were entirely successful, reputed monitoring institutions across the world have doubted the yield of the thermonuclear device tested by us. More importantly, a group of eminent Indian scientists led by the former Chairman of the AEC, Dr P.K. Iyengar, have expressed doubts whether the tests carried out so far are adequate for developing a credible and reliable deterrent, including thermonuclear weapons. The ultimate efficacy of a nuclear deterrent is its credibility in the eyes of others. We cannot ignore the doubts that have been expressed. 

Since the NPT was signed in 1970 China has increased its stockpile of nuclear weapons from 75 to over 300. France, which had a stockpile of 36 strategic nuclear weapons in 1970, now has over 400. The growth of the strategic arsenals of the USA and Russia has been even larger. In addition, the nuclear weapons powers have over 30,000 tactical nuclear weapons. Vertical proliferation has escalated since the NPT was signed. The United States Senate refused to ratify the CTBT on the grounds that it would compromise the country’s ability to test the reliability of its nuclear weapons. China agreed to join the discussions on the CTBT after conducting 45 nuclear tests, including a series of tests just on the eve of the talks. France did likewise. 

In recent days the international strategic scenario has been further complicated by the US decision to develop a national missile defence system. This has caused serious concern in Russia and China. The latter has given no indication whatsoever about its readiness to ratify the CTBT. Thus, we are at present going through an uncertain global strategic scenario where the nuclear weapons powers have not closed their options to test and improve their nuclear capabilities by one or more form of testing. In addition, China seems to have few inhibitions in transferring missile and nuclear capabilities to Pakistan. Given this Chinese propensity, we will have to develop our deterrent capabilities on the assumption that Beijing will transfer the knowhow for thermonuclear weapons also to our rather adventuristic western neighbour. 

The recently concluded NPT Review Conference in Geneva has important implications for India. The 187 member-countries asserted that India should not be recognised as a nuclear weapons state. There are to be continuing restrictions on the flow of dual use technology to India. Further, unless we agree to the NPT provisions and accept “Full Scope Safeguards”, we will not get any assistance for developing unclear power. Signing the CTBT at this stage is, therefore, not going to get us any economic benefits. We should not sign this treaty and forsake our nuclear autonomy at a time when nuclear and missile proliferation continues in our neighbourhood, and the international security situation remains uncertain. At the same time, we must be prepared to contribute to the efforts that reduce the risk of nuclear conflict globally and pursue the cause of universal nuclear disarmament. 

Our security is best guaranteed in a nuclear weapons-free world. Just as we were not deterred by the threat of economic sanctions in the past, we should now be prepared for a national effort to meet the challenges posed by the denial of dual use technologies to us. This will be a real test of our resolve and national will. 

Currently a Visiting Professor at the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi, the writer is India’s former High Commissioner to Pakistan.