The Pioneer

India had declined to accede to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty in 1970, not only because it was discriminatory, but also because we felt that the Treaty would not promote the cause of nuclear disarmament. 

Experience has shown that the NPT has only perpetuated the hegemony of the nuclear weapons states. It has not served the cause of disarmament. China, which had barely 75 strategic nuclear weapons in 1970, now has over 300. The French strategic stockpile has increased from 36 to around 420. The records of the United States, Russia and UK are no better, with the destructive powers of their strategic arsenals having substantially grown after the NPT was signed. The five nuclear weapons powers now have over 30,000 tactical nuclear warheads. 

The CTBT and the FMCT are non-proliferation measures advocated by the Clinton Administration primarily because of its desire to `cap, roll back and eliminate' India's nuclear weapons potential. The CTBT was mooted at a time when countries like the US, France, UK and the NATO Alliance were stridently proclaiming their right to use nuclear weapons in the pursuit of their security interests. The United States doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations of 1993 clearly postulates that it reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in Regional Contingencies. It implies that wherever the US cannot achieve its military objectives through conventional means, the use of nuclear weapons is not ruled out. After fuming for over twenty years against the NPT as an instrument of hegemony, the Chinese acceded to the Treaty, but have reserved the right to use nuclear weapons against non-signatories like India. 

On July 8, 1996, the International Court of Justice held that both the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons are contrary to the principles of international law. The Court also observed that: States which possess nuclear weapons must, within a reasonable time frame, take systematic action to eliminate completely all nuclear weapons. Yet, the nuclear weapons states have blocked every effort to commence discussions on nuclear disarmament within a time bound framework in Geneva. The CTBT was to have contained measures not merely to promote the cause of non-proliferation but to contribute effectively to the process of nuclear disarmament. What finally emerged was a flawed treaty with several loopholes designed to permit further refinement and testing by the nuclear weapons states. The entry into force provisions of the CTBT violated the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties, as they contained measures designed to pressurise and compel us to sign it. 

It is now generally acknowledged that both India and Pakistan possessed nuclear weapons for over a decade before Prime Minister Vajpayee took the logical and vitally necessary decision to establish the efficacy of our nuclear weapons arsenal with the Pokhran Tests of May 1998. The Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission revealed recently that of the five tests conducted by us in May 1998, only one test was of an actual nuclear weapon that had been with us for a few years. The other four were tests of weaponisable devices. The two stage thermonuclear device tested with a primary boosted fission capability was thus not an actual thermonuclear weapon. While the nation is more than proud of the achievements of its scientists, there are a few factors that we simply cannot ignore. Reputed institutions abroad have expressed a view that the thermonuclear test was not entirely successful. Secondly, a group of eminent Indian scientists led by the highly respected Dr PK Iyengar have expressed doubts about whether the tests conducted and data obtained so far are adequate for us to develop a credible stockpile, including thermonuclear weapons. Even if their views are debatable, we must remember that the credibility of our deterrent largely depends on its efficacy in the perceptions of others. 

China has assisted Pakistan for over two decades in the development of its nuclear weapons and missile programmes. During the tensions over Operation Brasstacks in 1987 Dr AQ Khan conveyed to us that Pakistan had nuclear weapons in its possession. Officials in the Bush Administration have claimed that Pakistan was preparing to load nuclear weapons on its F-16 aircraft during tensions over Kashmir in 1990. The designs of these enriched uranium nuclear weapons were provided by China. Since then China has supplied Pakistan nuclear capable M-11 missiles and assisted Pakistan to assemble its longer range Shaheen missiles. Chinese assistance for Pakistan s uranium enrichment programme has also continued. The Clinton Administration has continuously covered up the extent of this Sino-Pak nexus and sought to evade imposing mandatory sanctions, despite these blatant violations of the NPT and the MTCR. It would, therefore, only be prudent for us to develop our nuclear capabilities on the belief that China will provide data for thermonuclear weapons to Pakistan. 

The five nuclear weapons powers tested over 2000 nuclear weapons before agreeing to commence negotiations on the CTBT. Despite this, one of the reasons underlying the rejection of the CTBT by the US Senate was that the Treaty would inhibit the capability to test the reliability of the US nuclear arsenal. China, which has carried out 45 nuclear tests, and France, had been testing nuclear weapons for over three decades. Yet they carried out a series of nuclear tests before negotiations on the CTBT moved ahead. Is there any need for us to rush into signing the CTBT when doubts have been expressed about the adequacy of the five tests carried out by us in May 1998? 

The recently concluded NPT Review Conference has interesting lessons for us. The nuclear weapons states gave no firm commitment for nuclear disarmament at the Conference. The Conference did, however, call on India, Pakistan and Israel to sign the CTBT and NPT. It was asserted that India and Pakistan should not enjoy the status of nuclear weapons states. More importantly, there are to be continuing restrictions on the transfer of dual use technology. These restrictions will continue even if we sign the CTBT. We will also not be able to receive any new assistance for building nuclear power plants unless we accept NPT provisions and agree to full scope safeguards. Thus, claims that the US and its partners have accepted our nuclear status are both premature and misleading We have overcome the challenges posed by the economic sanctions that were imposed after the Pokhran tests. We will similarly overcome the difficulties arising out of the denial of dual use technology provided we display the national will and commitment to do so. 

There may be a view that after the Clinton visit, we should accommodate US wishes on the CTBT. Given the rejection of the CTBT by the US Senate, there is surely no need for our Parliament to be more obliging to the US President than his own Senate. We did not, after all, agree to President Jimmy Carter s wishes on full scope safeguards merely because he visited India. Non-proliferation and security priorities are notoriously short lived in the United States. Just as these priorities changed drastically when Mr Ronald Reagan succeeded Mr Jimmy Carter, they will change if Mr George Bush (Junior) becomes the next President of the United States. Finally, given the US determination to proceed with the development of missile defence systems, China s concern on this issue is going to lead to a period of strategic uncertainty. China has given no indication about its readiness to ratify the CTBT. It would be neither prudent nor wise to close any options in such an uncertain global strategic environment. 

Our relations with the US have broadened and matured in recent years. Differences on non-proliferation can and should be dealt with maturely, showing due respect and understanding for each other s concerns and perspectives. Senator Helms took several months to agree to a Senate discussion on the CTBT. There is, therefore, no hurry for our Parliament to reach a consensus on such a crucial issue.