The Times of India
26 Feb, 1999

To the US, the 'bedrock' of its policy towards nuclear India is the NPT. This has clearly been articulated by its spokesmen. According to deputy secretary Strobe Talbott: 'We do not, and will not, concede, even by implication, that India and Pakistan have established themselves as nuclear weapon states under the NPT. Unless and until they disavow nuclear weapons and accept safeguards on all their nuclear activities, they will continue to forfeit the full recognition and benefits that accrue to members in good standing of the NPT. This is a crucial and immutable guideline for our policy.''

Sanctions and Demands

Despite this articulation, India has held eight rounds of talks and apparently has promised further discussions. This has led to sharp divisions within India. Concerns have been heightened by the US assertion that India has given a commitment to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) by summer this year, in exchange, not for US ratification of that Treaty, but for an end to US blockage of World Bank loans to India, a punitive measure not even envisaged in US law. This indicates a disturbing direction to the talks in particular, but also to Indo-US relations in general.

India's position has always been that as long as there are nuclear weapons in the world, India would require these weapons for her security, having once faced, in 1971, a direct threat from them. What India has held to be in her long term interests has been a nuclear weapon free world, and the elimination of all nuclear weapons within a time-frame. What we now see, is a delinking of the CTBT from this objective, and a quid pro quo which is not only partial but against India's long-term interests as well.

India has been faced with sanctions and demands that it not only accept the US-led new world order, but embrace all its control mechanisms -- the NPT and its offspring, the CTBT and the proposed Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). In order to safeguard its nuclear option, India has faced sanctions for over three decades: the important point is that signature of the CTBT will not remove the most important sanctions against us.

The CTBT emerged in 1996 as a non-proliferation tool, devoid of any disarmament element. Faced with a defective CTBT, a national consensus emerged not to sign the treaty. It is amazing that some of those who had opposed the CTBT most strongly, who had felt that if sanctions were imposed, `sehna hai to sehna padega', are now arguing that, following Pokhran II, India can now sign the treaty. Has the treaty been changed even by one word? Does it no longer impact on India's interests, both her own security and her commitment to nuclear disarmament?

First and foremost, it should be recognised that the CTBT and the proposed FMCT are not 'stand alone' treaties, but flow directly from the NPT and are targeted at the `holdouts' to the NPT. All non-nuclear weapon states signatories of the NPT are in any case forbidden to test or manufacture nuclear weapons; only the five `declared nuclear weapon states have, and continue to have that privilege. Second, the CTBT is a partial and dangerous treaty with loopholes that allow these five countries to continue to qualitatively improve their arsenals. During the CTBT negotiations, there were parallel P-5 negotiations, where it was decided what activities would be permitted to them under a CTBT. Once there was agreement among them on this issue, the CTBT text emerged. As a non-member of the P-5, these 'permissible activities' (such as subcritical tests) are now open to India.

Satellite Spying

Third, the CTBT verification regime, which was not examined in any detail by the Indian authorities during the negotiations, is a highly unequal and discriminatory one. The International Monitoring System (IMS) can detect only explosive tests above a level of one kiloton, and that too, in a non-clandestine environment. This leaves room for the P-5 to conduct not only highly sophisticated `subcritical' tests under Article 1 of the treaty, but underground tests at very low yields. True, this is a loophole that can be used by other putative nuclear weapon states as well. So, who will monitor tests between zero yield and 1,000 tonnes? This has been catered to, in the CTBT, by NTMs-National Technical Means, which in reality means espionage, satellite surveillance, humint etc, and it is only the major powers that have such capabilities, and the clout to have the products of such NTMs internationally accepted. The fact is, that the CTBT which we did not accept as `flawed' in 1996 remains as flawed today. And, it still does not contribute to nuclear disarmament, but undermines moves in that direction.

Becoming a party to the CTBT would be tantamount to joining the inequitable nuclear regime we have fought so long against. It would mean our joining the pyramidal international power structure with the US at its apex. What does India gain by signing the CTBT? Certainly not the lifting of sanctions on the flow of advanced and dual-use technologies. That depends on our signing the NPT. Is that where we are headed?

Permanent Dissident

A US official once called India a 'permanent dissident'. This term has now been picked up by some Indians, including in the establishment, to justify why India should join the New World Order. Had India not been a 'permanent dissident', we would not have preserved our nuclear option, and more important, may not have gained our independence. Today, the US and its allies will not change the NPT to accommodate the new realities; so, will India be signing the CTBT and joining the international 'mainstream' as a non-nuclear state or as a state which is not recognised as a nuclear weapon state but has nuclear weapons? We might then be told we are in violation of the NPT and the international non-proliferation regime. Will we then accept a "rollback'' of our nuclear programme?

India cannot and should not accept control regimes that would be indefinite in time and would jeopardise our decision-making autonomy. Our security interests cannot be `harmonised' with an inequitable world order and certainly not by signing dangerous control mechanisms like the CTBT.

Just as the US will not recognise India as a nuclear weapon state under the NPT, India cannot and should not accept that the NPT has conferred a special status on the P-5 to retain and modernise their nuclear arsenals indefinitely.