Mr. Thierry de Montbrial
(TdM), the Director of IFRI expressed his happiness with the visit
of Principal Secretary (Pr.Secy) to IFRI. Recalling that barely
an year ago, he had delivered a talk in the same hall at IFRI, TdM hoped
that Pr.Secy would visit IFRI at least every year to talk about the world
in general, and the Indian subcontinent in particular. He added that Pr.Secy
was one of the main actors on the scene today in an important part of the
world. He thanked him for accepting IFRI's invitation and invited him to
speak on the topic "India and the stability of the Asian continent".
Expressing his delight at being present at IFRI once again, Pr.Secy
said that he would try not to repeat anything from his previous presentation.
Much had happened in the world in the last one year, allowing him to speak
about the stability of Asia, and the role that India might be able to play
in fostering it.
Following the speech, (copy of speech as delivered, enclosed), TdM
thanked him for the extremely interesting presentation and reassured Pr.Secy
that it was entirely different from what he had talked about the previous
year. He said that like most experts in Asia, Pr.Secy clearly belonged
to the Realist School of international relations, which made a sharp distinction
between the international and the domestic realm, and upheld the principle
of non-intervention as well. His framework had conceived the international
scene as a 'power game' and had almost avoided any reference to the domestic
situations within countries - for example, the momentous events in Iran.
It seemed to him that the intellectual gap between the West and the East
in this respect was only growing wider and wider. The European and North
American approach to international relations was intertwined with domestic
aspects like human rights, right to information, democratization etc. which
was not the case in the eastern approach. Citing the example of the internal
situation in Chechnya and Kosovo, he asked Pr.Secy if he felt that non-Russians
should have nothing to say about the domestic situations prevailing in
these areas. He summarized his comments with the following questions:
(1) Did Pr.Secy agree with his analysis of the
Western/Eastern difference in intellectual approach to international relations?
(ii) If he did agree with the analysis, did he
foresee this dichotomy in analytical frameworks leading to problems in
the future?
Pr.Secy said that in a very indirect
way, he had referred to 'us' and 'them' (Europe/ North America) in his
speech. For many Indians, the colonial and imperial legacy was still very
fresh, and, therefore, the notion of sovereignty had much greater sanctity
in their part of the world than it did in Europe. Secondly, India stood
for a democratic order in the world. Pr.Secy mentioned, as an aside, that
India had, in fact, joined the 'Community of Democracies' which France
had not for it's own reasons. India also supported the promotion of human
rights everywhere. But the difference between the Western and Eastern approach
was that while the West wanted to impose democracy and human rights by
employing direct or indirect pressures, India preferred an evolution towards
democratic order and protection of human rights in a country. Thirdly,
though the West might not agree, there were no absolutes with regard to
human rights, since there were differences among various regions due to
historical, cultural and civilisational reasons. These differences did
exist between societies, but after the Cold War, both North America and
Europe had tended to ignore them and had tried, instead, to push for adoption
of universal codes of human rights, regardless of whether they were suited
to a particular socio-economic environment or not. Speaking frankly as
a friend, said Pr.Secy, this absolutism in human rights had led to problems.
Pointing out to what was happening in Indonesia, he said that after a small
territory like East Timor had held its referendum, several other regions
like Irian Java, Moluccas and others had begun clamouring for autonomy,
if not independence, today. He wondered whether all this had provided a
stable framework for ASEAN, or if it was likely to lead to incalculable
consequences for the security and the economy of the region. Citing the
example of Kosovo, where India and the West had differences, he remarked
that the sovereignty of a country had been disturbed. While it was claimed
that it was just a question of autonomy and protection of the human rights
of the Albanians, he asked if anybody in the gathering could guarantee
anymore that Kosovo would return to the fold of Yugoslavia. Observing that
absolutism might lead to consequences far beyond than what had been calculated,
he clarified that India did not disagree with the idea that democracy ought
to be promoted. The democratic order in various countries were necessary,
because in the very long run they did provide for stability, although it
was common knowledge that democracies could quarrel like cats and dogs
when necessary! Saying that the same held true for human rights, he cautioned
that one must, however, proceed in a very guarded fashion, neither push
it nor impose it. Citing the example of the Central Asian Republics, he
said that they were worried about religious extremism and the influence
of the Taliban today. They had to take counter measures, even though those
counter measures did not necessarily mesh in with the Western concept of
human rights. He asked what was more important for the Central Asian Republics
- to repulse the Taliban or follow every tenet of human rights laid down
by the West. In conclusion, he said that India agreed that these were values
that ought to be to be promoted, but in a cautious manner.
Qualifying his earlier question, TdM
remarked at this point, that personally he was much closer to Pr.Secy's
views than the western point of view. People like him were, however, in
a minority in the West. He then invited questions from the audience.
Mr. Terry Coster from the audience raised the
issue of demographic pressure on big Asian countries like India and China.
In view of India's rapidly growing population and the significant segment
living in poverty, he wanted to know Pr.Secy's views on demographic pressure
as a likely threat to Asian stability.
Pr.Secy said that if the conclusion
of the question was that larger populations disrupted democratic order,
he was not in agreement with it. He said that India and China were both
big countries, but since China did not have a democratic or pluralistic
order, he would take the example of India as a case in point. Despite a
doubling of the Indian population in the last 53-54 years, democracy had
taken strong roots in the country. He emphasized that it was, in fact,
this democratic order that had maintained the unity of the country, in
spite of its rich diversity. Explaining that India's diversity was not
cultural or religious in nature, but mainly linguistic, he added that this
immense diversity had been accommodated by recognizing the individual characteristics
of each region, and by giving enough room for each of them to play in the
democratic system. Elaborating on the aspect of linguistic diversity, he
added that the Indian constitution recognized 17 languages (although most
of the work was done in English at the Union-level and at the state-level
in regional languages). The channels of communication like electronic and
print media mainly used vernacular languages. The Indian National television
"Doordarshan" itself was broadcast in 16-17 different languages, a fact
one could see even in the recent international coverage of the earthquake
in India which had used the feed originating from the regional Gujarati
TV station.
It was found that, in the midst of this diversity,
if one allowed the people to let off steam every two or three years, they
exercised their will by voting out the Prime Minister or Chief Minister
rather than taking up arms - thus promoting stability in the country. Reverting
to the Indonesian example, Pr.Secy added that if the transformation from
dictatorial to democratic order in Indonesia had taken place earlier, perhaps
situations like Irian Jaya, Aceh and East Timor could have been resolved
in time. But since there was no democratic order, and therefore no room
for ethnic and other groups to play their part in the country, the above
situations had been created. Conceding that it was, however, important
for India to contain its population growth, he said that while India had
not been as successful as China in this regard, progress was being made
and it was hoped that something would be achieved in the next few years.
TdM asked if Pr.Secy had meant to say that the
process of democratization in Indonesia was irreversible. Given the fact
that the Wahid government was unstable, was a return to military rule not
likely in Indonesia?
Pr.Secy replied that he was not
summarily ruling out a return to military rule but pointed out that Megawati
Sukarnoputri, the Vice President, had the second strongest party in the
Indonesian Parliament, which was also untainted by corruption. Saying that
in the first place, he hoped that Wahid, who was a fatherly figure in Indonesian
politics, would continue in power, he added that even if he did not continue
for one reason or another, Megawati, who was beginning to take a very active
part in decision making, could well be the next head of the Indonesian
Government. He said that one would have to wait and see the developments.
The next question referred to an article that
appeared last December in the South China Morning Post (Hong Kong
edition), in which one of the leading political figures from India had
been quoted as saying that the most vital challenge for India in the coming
century would be a confrontation with China. Pr.Secy's comments were sought
on the above.
Pr.Secy said that he would like
to take a look at this quotation himself since neither the Indian Prime
Minister nor External Affairs Minister believed that a confrontation with
China was inevitable. He reiterated that a confrontation was not inevitable.
If the intention of the question was to know the present status of Sino-Indian
relations, he would do so. Proceeding to explain the status of bilateral
relations, he said that there had been a very tense period immediately
after the Indian nuclear tests in May 1998, but within a year, the Indian
External Affairs Minister had been in Beijing in the midst of the Kargil
conflict with Pakistan. It was there that they had agreed upon holding
a security dialogue between India and China. An agreement had also been
subsequently reached to exchange maps of the Line of Actual Control so
that the perceptions of both sides were clear. The exchange of maps for
one sector of the LAC had taken place in November last year. Perhaps, before
the end of this year, India and China would have exchanged maps for the
remaining two sectors as well the Eastern and the Western sectors. What
was going on was a clarification of the LAC to ensure that there were no
incidents of intrusion from either side, a factor that would help stabilise
the LAC. India hoped that there would be negotiations on the border as
well. Since the second half of 1999, high level exchanges had been resumed
between the two countries. The Indian President and the External Affairs
Minister had both been in China during May-June 2000, and earlier that
month Mr. Li Peng visited India. The Chinese Prime Minister was also likely
to come to India sometime this year. Summarizing the current state of bilateral
relations, he remarked that there were increased consultations between
the two countries on various questions now than there were 2-3 years ago,
and that there had been some evolution in Chinese policy towards India
in the last couple of years. Without being very optimistic, he said, things
were looking up between the two countries. There could, perhaps, be a 'modus
vivendi' for the bilateral relationship in the near future. Therefore,
he would not say that there would necessarily be a confrontation with China.
Pr.Secy was asked about his views regarding the
perception of China in India, not among the political class, but among
the analysts. Noting that some leading Indian analysts advocated a strong
engagement with China, while others expressed strong distrust of China,
Pr.Secy was asked to give his understanding of the situation. He was also
asked, if in 10-20 years time, he envisaged some sort of a balance between
the two leading Asian countries, and if so, did he see it as purely strategic,
economic or civilisational (as in the case of Iran)? The questioner also
wished to know the current thinking in Delhi about this scenario.
Pr.Secy replied that obviously there
was a great degree of mistrust between India and China, a fact acknowledged
recently even by Mr. Li Peng in his talk at the India International Centre
in New Delhi, where he admitted that there was a lack of trust between
the two countries, and said that this was something that needed to be improved.
Therefore, it was obvious that journalists and analysts would state this
fact. Reiterating that he was not overly optimistic, Pr.Secy said that
things were, nevertheless' looking up though what happened next remained
to be seen. The two countries were trying to do the following:
(i) To stabilize the Line of Actual Control so
that there would be no military confrontation between the two countries.
(ii) To hold a dialogue which covered the security
concerns of the two countries.
(iii) To cooperate on regional and international
questions.
There was, of course, an economic dimension to
it as well, he said. These efforts were being made by both India and China.
He urged people not to forget that China was still wedded to what Deng
Xiaoping called, in 1979, the four modernisations, and China's need for
peace and stability on its borders in, order to succeed in realizing the
four modernisations. This was what China was pursuing, and one of the examples
was the successful border agreement concluded by them with Vietnam. He
added that India had also conveyed to China that what China was doing with
Pakistan in relation to India was a matter of deep concern to India. Pr.Secy
said that even while Mr. Li Peng urged greater trust between the two countries,
it was this Pakistan factor which was one of the reasons for the mistrust.
Clarifying that it was not his personal opinion,
Mr. Ramesh Mulye (DCM at the Embassy in Paris till his voluntary retirement
from service) asked for Pr.Secy's comments on reports alleging that the
nuclear flash point had shifted to the South Asian region following the
Indian and Pakistani nuclear explosions, given the tensions in Kashmir.
Secondly, he asked for Pr.Secy's reactions on the opinion in some sections
that it was General Parvez Musharraf's regime and the army in Pakistan
which stood between chaos and stability in Pakistan today, and that India's
interest and hope for peace in Kashmir lay in a dialogue with the current
regime in Pakistan.
Given the state of relations between India and
Pakistan and the fact that they were now nuclear weapon states, Pr.Secy
said that there was an apprehension in Europe and North America about the
possibility of a nuclear conflict between the two countries. Saying that
India had shown, through its pronouncements and actions, that it was a
responsible State, he cited as examples, India's policy of 'no-first-use'
of nuclear weapons and refusal to engage in a nuclear arms race. India
did not want to catch up with China, either in the number of nuclear warheads
or variety of delivery systems, since India did not have the resources.
India had placed a moratorium, which was not time bound, on nuclear testing
and this would continue regardless of whether CTBT came into force or not.
As the most important example, he cited the Kargil conflict when India
stuck to the policy of not crossing the Line of Control despite the most
intense provocation from Pakistan, and had thus demonstrated to the world
that it was a responsible nuclear power. While he could not speak on behalf
of Pakistan, he said that General Musharraf had been saying since he took
over as the C.E.O. of Pakistan, that there was no question of a large-scale
conflict between India and Pakistan. Both the countries had said it on
more than one occasion. The nuclear factor was beginning to have an impact
on the thinking of the two countries and on the danger of a conventional
conflict escalating into something more. While one could not guarantee
that this thinking had permeated down the hierarchy in the Pakistani armed
forces, Pr.Secy said that it had begun to manifest itself.
TdM intervened to ask if it implied that nuclear
proliferation was beginning to have a stabilizing effect in Asia?
Pr.Secy replied
that he did not mean to say that proliferation had done this or that. All
he wanted to say was that the conduct of India should reassure other countries.
In response to the second part of the question
by Mr. Mulye, Pr.Secy said that as one would expect, India had been listening
carefully and following Gen. Musharraf s actions since he took over, and
added that there was enough contact between the two countries to know what
each side was thinking. (though not much of this contact was publicized).
When Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was in power, he said, India was told
that he was the 'best bet' and that India should come to an agreement with
him. Again when Gen. Musharraf took over, India was told by influential
countries in the West that he was a moderate man and India should come
to some agreement with him. Commenting on the actions of the 'moderate'
Gen. Musharraf, he said that he had completely reversed the policies of
Nawaz Sharif so far as relations with India were concerned. Nawaz Sharif
was beginning to come round to the point of being open to a dialogue on
all contentious bilateral matters in order to try and solve them one by
one, without waiting for a solution to Kashmir. Gen. Musharraf had completely
reversed Nawaz Sharif s policy towards India. He believed that a resolution
of the Kashmir conflict was the beginning of good relations between India
and Pakistan. Adding that Musharraf had failed on every front in Pakistan
- politically, economically and socially, Pr.Secy remarked that Pakistan
was today in a political, economic and social mess. The only credit Gen.
Musharraf could claim was that he had succeeded in bringing the Kashmir
question right in the center of Pakistan's concerns and at the center of
Indo-Pak relations. He remarked wryly that this was the 'moderate' man
one was talking about. He said that he was speaking among friends and,
therefore, hoped that he would not be quoted outside. The present Prime
Minister of India was indeed the best bet for a solution to Kashmir. While
he was not casting doubts on the patriotism of Mrs. Sonia Gandhi or her
concern for India in any way, he said that if in the future, Mrs. Sonia
Gandhi came to power, she would have to think a hundred times before taking
any initiative to bring peace in Kashmir. The simple fact of her foreign
origin would restrain her in whatever action she should wish to take. Pointing
out that Prime Minister Vajpayee was more moderate than Gen. Musharraf,
he added that Prime Minister Vajpayee wanted peace and had demonstrated
through the initiatives he had taken in the last two years his desire for
peace in Kashmir. Citing the examples of Prime Minister Vajpayee's initiatives
and the responses he had received from Gen. Musharraf in return, he once
again posed the question as to who among the two was in reality the moderate
man. Prime Minister Vajpayee had visited Lahore and the monument commemorating
the creation of Pakistan, and was in turn rewarded by Kargil; he had announced
a cease-fire for the holy month of Ramzan and had extended it twice only
to be reciprocated by a higher rate of civilian casualty in Jammu &
Kashmir. Clarifying that he did not want to give the impression that India
had given up, he said that India would continue to tell Pakistan to stop
cross border terrorism so that the two countries could sit down and discuss
Kashmir in order to try and settle the issue. But Pakistan would not be
able to do it by dragging India forcibly to the conference table with a
pistol to its head. Both sides could sit down and discuss only when the
pistol was removed.
Referring to Indo-U.S. relations which were growing
warmer mainly due to the successful Indian diaspora transforming itself
into an influential political lobby, and the 'human bond' factor it had
created, Pr.Secy was asked about how he envisaged the emerging Indo-European
relationship in the absence of this 'human bond' factor.
Pr.Secy replied that while the significance
of the contribution of the 'Indian Americans' could not be underestimated
in terms of its impact on Indo-U.S. relations, it was not the only factor
in the improvement in the bilateral relations. Among the various factors
responsible for the warmth in the Indo-US relations, were the end of the
Cold War, the recognition by USA that it was no longer necessary to maintain
parity in its dealings with India and Pakistan, as well as the conclusion
that India was a good balance in Asia with its economic liberalization
and huge market. All the above factors, he said, had led to a bipartisan
consensus in the United States for a new kind of relationship with India.
Remarking that this had happened particularly in the last 2-3 years of
the Clinton Administration, he added that he had the impression that the
Republicans too had a similar perception with regard to relations with
India. He said he was very doubtful whether this closeness would lead to
any kind of strategic partnership between the two countries, given the
fact that USA had its own global agenda and India had its agenda, limited
perhaps to the region, but also with regard to international affairs. He
expressed doubts on whether there would be complete concordance of views
on global issues between India and USA and added that perhaps there would
be much more of an understanding between India and France than between
India and US. Having said that, he said, the effort on both sides (Indian
and American) was to come closer to each other and to try and work out
a relationship, which reflected the current reality, unburdened by the
legacy of the Cold War. This was already happening and one had to wait
and see how far it would go. Excluding the Indian community factor, the
other factors that accounted for growing warmth in Indo-U.S. ties held
good for Indo-Europe relations too - Europe too saw India as a good balance
in Asia; it viewed Indian economic liberalization and reform as good opportunities
for interaction between Europe and India; and Europe too regarded India
as an emerging important player in economic and strategic matters in the
global arena in the coming decades. The same factors operated in Indo-Europe
relations but perhaps it would only take a little while longer.
Maj. Fida Malik from Pakistan Army asked for Pr.Secy's
comments on the on-going missile race in the subcontinent between India
and Pakistan, and on whether it would be possible for the two countries
to co-exist in a climate of good neighbourliness even if a resolution of
the Kashmir conflict was somehow achieved.
Pr.Secy responded that the Indian
perception was that Kashmir was not the root cause of the problems between
India and Pakistan. It was seen as an important question, or even as a
'dispute', but not as the 'sole' cause of the problem. He added that the
fundamentalist outfits in Pakistan (or 'terrorist outfits' as they were
called in India) like Lashkar-e-Toiba, Harkat-ul-Ansar, Al Badr etc. said
that they would liberate Kashmir first, and then soon after, liberate all
the Muslims in India,, which meant Jehad' not just in Kashmir, but jehad
against the entire country. Saying that these terrorist groups were being
supported in one way or the other by the Government of Pakistan since decades,
he pointed out that Gen. Musharraf, after coming to power, had made jehad'
an instrument of state policy. It was common knowledge that it was far
easier to set up terrorist outfits than to dismantle them. Commenting that
we had all seen what had happened in many parts of Pakistan due to the
Taliban phenomenon, he added that the Taliban, which had originated in
Pakistan, and then been exported to Afghanistan, had today made a return
journey to many parts of Pakistan. The question was whether Gen. Musharraf
or the collectivity of Generals who ran Pakistan today, were willing or
even able to control this extremism, which seemed to be eating away at
the vitals of Pakistan itself - politically, economically and socially.
Saying that if they were not able to do so, it would have incalculable
consequences in the rest of South Asia and Central Asia, Pr.Secy added
that one evidence of Pakistan's willingness or ability to control extremism
would be to curb cross border terrorism into India. Another proof would
be to see if Pakistan would cooperate with the UN Security Council resolution
against the Taliban. That, he said, would soon be evident.
In reply to the question on the 'tit for tat'
missile race between India and Pakistan, he said that India had a long-term
plan for indigenous missile development since the early 80's. Agni, Prithvi,
Trishul etc. were part of this two-decade old indigenous programme, and
it would continue. He remarked that surprisingly India hardly commented
when 'Shaheen' or 'Gauri' was fired in Pakistan, but every time India fired
one of her missiles, the whole world seemed to come down on India and accuse
it of disturbing the atmosphere. When missiles were transferred from China
and Korea to Pakistan (there was irrefutable evidence of that, as was evident
from the large number of M 11's owned by Pakistan), nothing had happened
and the world had not been able to stop China from supplying them. Pr.Secy
referred to the Korean ship headed for Pakistan, which had been impounded
in India for carrying spare parts and complete blueprints of missiles,
as another case in point. This was unfortunate but true. However, he concluded
that if the two countries continued to act responsibly, (he was confident
that they would), the situation would not get worse.
Prefacing his question with the admission that
he was asking the same question as he had done last year, Mr. Jean Alphonse
Bernard referred to the recent initiatives taken by Prime Minister Vajpayee
in Kashmir, and said that something was moving politically in Kashmir.
He said he considered Prime Minister Vajpayee as the best hope for a solution
in Kashmir, considering the improvement he had brought about in Indo-Pak
relations as the Foreign Minister in the Janata Government back in 1977-78,
and the fact that he was a staunch champion of Indian nationalism. He appreciated
India's courage in maintaining the cease-fire in spite of a lack of response
from terrorist outfits, and remarked that Kashmir, however, tended to drag
down India's power and prestige in the world. He wanted to know from Pr.Secy
what the Prime Minister hoped to achieve by the efforts he had made in
the last few months. Given the fact that the situation in Pakistan was
not politically conducive, and that not much could be achieved without
the participation of Pakistan, he said that some people now expected India
to take a bold initiative politically with respect to Kashmir. He wanted
to know if Pr.Secy thought that this was the right moment for such an initiative
on the part of India.
Pr.Secy said he hoped that India
would not disappoint him in this regard and that India would take necessary
steps. He told him that it had already done so for more than a year now,
and added that if Mr. Bernard had an occasion to visit Kashmir now, he
would find a totally changed atmosphere. Saying that the longing for peace
had grown intense today, he added that all the Indian initiatives in Kashmir
were intended to respond to this longing of the people - the release of
the Hurriyat leaders, the talks with various sections, the cease-fire etc.
He said that, unfortunately, there were people who wanted to sabotage these
efforts, and added that one could only wait and see how far the Indian
Government could go despite the provocations and the killings sponsored
by the other side of the Line of Control and the International Border.
TdM thanked Pr.Secy for the extremely
interesting exchange of views, and reiterated his hope that Pr.Secy would
visit IFRI at least once a year. |