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Question and Answer Session
following the Address by Principal Secretary
at
IFRI (Institute Francaise des Relations Internationale)
(January 31, 2001)

"India and the stability of the Asian continent" 
 
Mr. Thierry de Montbrial (TdM), the Director of IFRI expressed his happiness with the visit of Principal Secretary (Pr.Secy) to IFRI. Recalling that barely an year ago, he had delivered a talk in the same hall at IFRI, TdM hoped that Pr.Secy would visit IFRI at least every year to talk about the world in general, and the Indian subcontinent in particular. He added that Pr.Secy was one of the main actors on the scene today in an important part of the world. He thanked him for accepting IFRI's invitation and invited him to speak on the topic "India and the stability of the Asian continent"

Expressing his delight at being present at IFRI once again, Pr.Secy said that he would try not to repeat anything from his previous presentation. Much had happened in the world in the last one year, allowing him to speak about the stability of Asia, and the role that India might be able to play in fostering it.

Following the speech, (copy of speech as delivered, enclosed), TdM thanked him for the extremely interesting presentation and reassured Pr.Secy that it was entirely different from what he had talked about the previous year. He said that like most experts in Asia, Pr.Secy clearly belonged to the Realist School of international relations, which made a sharp distinction between the international and the domestic realm, and upheld the principle of non-intervention as well. His framework had conceived the international scene as a 'power game' and had almost avoided any reference to the domestic situations within countries - for example, the momentous events in Iran. It seemed to him that the intellectual gap between the West and the East in this respect was only growing wider and wider. The European and North American approach to international relations was intertwined with domestic aspects like human rights, right to information, democratization etc. which was not the case in the eastern approach. Citing the example of the internal situation in Chechnya and Kosovo, he asked Pr.Secy if he felt that non-Russians should have nothing to say about the domestic situations prevailing in these areas. He summarized his comments with the following questions: 

(1) Did Pr.Secy agree with his analysis of the Western/Eastern difference in intellectual approach to international relations? 

(ii) If he did agree with the analysis, did he foresee this dichotomy in analytical frameworks leading to problems in the future? 

Pr.Secy said that in a very indirect way, he had referred to 'us' and 'them' (Europe/ North America) in his speech. For many Indians, the colonial and imperial legacy was still very fresh, and, therefore, the notion of sovereignty had much greater sanctity in their part of the world than it did in Europe. Secondly, India stood for a democratic order in the world. Pr.Secy mentioned, as an aside, that India had, in fact, joined the 'Community of Democracies' which France had not for it's own reasons. India also supported the promotion of human rights everywhere. But the difference between the Western and Eastern approach was that while the West wanted to impose democracy and human rights by employing direct or indirect pressures, India preferred an evolution towards democratic order and protection of human rights in a country. Thirdly, though the West might not agree, there were no absolutes with regard to human rights, since there were differences among various regions due to historical, cultural and civilisational reasons. These differences did exist between societies, but after the Cold War, both North America and Europe had tended to ignore them and had tried, instead, to push for adoption of universal codes of human rights, regardless of whether they were suited to a particular socio-economic environment or not. Speaking frankly as a friend, said Pr.Secy, this absolutism in human rights had led to problems. Pointing out to what was happening in Indonesia, he said that after a small territory like East Timor had held its referendum, several other regions like Irian Java, Moluccas and others had begun clamouring for autonomy, if not independence, today. He wondered whether all this had provided a stable framework for ASEAN, or if it was likely to lead to incalculable consequences for the security and the economy of the region. Citing the example of Kosovo, where India and the West had differences, he remarked that the sovereignty of a country had been disturbed. While it was claimed that it was just a question of autonomy and protection of the human rights of the Albanians, he asked if anybody in the gathering could guarantee anymore that Kosovo would return to the fold of Yugoslavia. Observing that absolutism might lead to consequences far beyond than what had been calculated, he clarified that India did not disagree with the idea that democracy ought to be promoted. The democratic order in various countries were necessary, because in the very long run they did provide for stability, although it was common knowledge that democracies could quarrel like cats and dogs when necessary! Saying that the same held true for human rights, he cautioned that one must, however, proceed in a very guarded fashion, neither push it nor impose it. Citing the example of the Central Asian Republics, he said that they were worried about religious extremism and the influence of the Taliban today. They had to take counter measures, even though those counter measures did not necessarily mesh in with the Western concept of human rights. He asked what was more important for the Central Asian Republics - to repulse the Taliban or follow every tenet of human rights laid down by the West. In conclusion, he said that India agreed that these were values that ought to be to be promoted, but in a cautious manner.

Qualifying his earlier question, TdM remarked at this point, that personally he was much closer to Pr.Secy's views than the western point of view. People like him were, however, in a minority in the West. He then invited questions from the audience. 

Mr. Terry Coster from the audience raised the issue of demographic pressure on big Asian countries like India and China. In view of India's rapidly growing population and the significant segment living in poverty, he wanted to know Pr.Secy's views on demographic pressure as a likely threat to Asian stability. 

Pr.Secy said that if the conclusion of the question was that larger populations disrupted democratic order, he was not in agreement with it. He said that India and China were both big countries, but since China did not have a democratic or pluralistic order, he would take the example of India as a case in point. Despite a doubling of the Indian population in the last 53-54 years, democracy had taken strong roots in the country. He emphasized that it was, in fact, this democratic order that had maintained the unity of the country, in spite of its rich diversity. Explaining that India's diversity was not cultural or religious in nature, but mainly linguistic, he added that this immense diversity had been accommodated by recognizing the individual characteristics of each region, and by giving enough room for each of them to play in the democratic system. Elaborating on the aspect of linguistic diversity, he added that the Indian constitution recognized 17 languages (although most of the work was done in English at the Union-level and at the state-level in regional languages). The channels of communication like electronic and print media mainly used vernacular languages. The Indian National television "Doordarshan" itself was broadcast in 16-17 different languages, a fact one could see even in the recent international coverage of the earthquake in India which had used the feed originating from the regional Gujarati TV station. 

It was found that, in the midst of this diversity, if one allowed the people to let off steam every two or three years, they exercised their will by voting out the Prime Minister or Chief Minister rather than taking up arms - thus promoting stability in the country. Reverting to the Indonesian example, Pr.Secy added that if the transformation from dictatorial to democratic order in Indonesia had taken place earlier, perhaps situations like Irian Jaya, Aceh and East Timor could have been resolved in time. But since there was no democratic order, and therefore no room for ethnic and other groups to play their part in the country, the above situations had been created. Conceding that it was, however, important for India to contain its population growth, he said that while India had not been as successful as China in this regard, progress was being made and it was hoped that something would be achieved in the next few years. 

TdM asked if Pr.Secy had meant to say that the process of democratization in Indonesia was irreversible. Given the fact that the Wahid government was unstable, was a return to military rule not likely in Indonesia? 

Pr.Secy replied that he was not summarily ruling out a return to military rule but pointed out that Megawati Sukarnoputri, the Vice President, had the second strongest party in the Indonesian Parliament, which was also untainted by corruption. Saying that in the first place, he hoped that Wahid, who was a fatherly figure in Indonesian politics, would continue in power, he added that even if he did not continue for one reason or another, Megawati, who was beginning to take a very active part in decision making, could well be the next head of the Indonesian Government. He said that one would have to wait and see the developments. 

The next question referred to an article that appeared last December in the South China Morning Post (Hong Kong edition), in which one of the leading political figures from India had been quoted as saying that the most vital challenge for India in the coming century would be a confrontation with China. Pr.Secy's comments were sought on the above. 

Pr.Secy said that he would like to take a look at this quotation himself since neither the Indian Prime Minister nor External Affairs Minister believed that a confrontation with China was inevitable. He reiterated that a confrontation was not inevitable. If the intention of the question was to know the present status of Sino-Indian relations, he would do so. Proceeding to explain the status of bilateral relations, he said that there had been a very tense period immediately after the Indian nuclear tests in May 1998, but within a year, the Indian External Affairs Minister had been in Beijing in the midst of the Kargil conflict with Pakistan. It was there that they had agreed upon holding a security dialogue between India and China. An agreement had also been subsequently reached to exchange maps of the Line of Actual Control so that the perceptions of both sides were clear. The exchange of maps for one sector of the LAC had taken place in November last year. Perhaps, before the end of this year, India and China would have exchanged maps for the remaining two sectors as well the Eastern and the Western sectors. What was going on was a clarification of the LAC to ensure that there were no incidents of intrusion from either side, a factor that would help stabilise the LAC. India hoped that there would be negotiations on the border as well. Since the second half of 1999, high level exchanges had been resumed between the two countries. The Indian President and the External Affairs Minister had both been in China during May-June 2000, and earlier that month Mr. Li Peng visited India. The Chinese Prime Minister was also likely to come to India sometime this year. Summarizing the current state of bilateral relations, he remarked that there were increased consultations between the two countries on various questions now than there were 2-3 years ago, and that there had been some evolution in Chinese policy towards India in the last couple of years. Without being very optimistic, he said, things were looking up between the two countries. There could, perhaps, be a 'modus vivendi' for the bilateral relationship in the near future. Therefore, he would not say that there would necessarily be a confrontation with China. 

Pr.Secy was asked about his views regarding the perception of China in India, not among the political class, but among the analysts. Noting that some leading Indian analysts advocated a strong engagement with China, while others expressed strong distrust of China, Pr.Secy was asked to give his understanding of the situation. He was also asked, if in 10-20 years time, he envisaged some sort of a balance between the two leading Asian countries, and if so, did he see it as purely strategic, economic or civilisational (as in the case of Iran)? The questioner also wished to know the current thinking in Delhi about this scenario. 

Pr.Secy replied that obviously there was a great degree of mistrust between India and China, a fact acknowledged recently even by Mr. Li Peng in his talk at the India International Centre in New Delhi, where he admitted that there was a lack of trust between the two countries, and said that this was something that needed to be improved. Therefore, it was obvious that journalists and analysts would state this fact. Reiterating that he was not overly optimistic, Pr.Secy said that things were, nevertheless' looking up though what happened next remained to be seen. The two countries were trying to do the following: 

(i) To stabilize the Line of Actual Control so that there would be no military confrontation between the two countries. 
(ii) To hold a dialogue which covered the security concerns of the two countries. 
(iii) To cooperate on regional and international questions.

There was, of course, an economic dimension to it as well, he said. These efforts were being made by both India and China. He urged people not to forget that China was still wedded to what Deng Xiaoping called, in 1979, the four modernisations, and China's need for peace and stability on its borders in, order to succeed in realizing the four modernisations. This was what China was pursuing, and one of the examples was the successful border agreement concluded by them with Vietnam. He added that India had also conveyed to China that what China was doing with Pakistan in relation to India was a matter of deep concern to India. Pr.Secy said that even while Mr. Li Peng urged greater trust between the two countries, it was this Pakistan factor which was one of the reasons for the mistrust. 

Clarifying that it was not his personal opinion, Mr. Ramesh Mulye (DCM at the Embassy in Paris till his voluntary retirement from service) asked for Pr.Secy's comments on reports alleging that the nuclear flash point had shifted to the South Asian region following the Indian and Pakistani nuclear explosions, given the tensions in Kashmir. Secondly, he asked for Pr.Secy's reactions on the opinion in some sections that it was General Parvez Musharraf's regime and the army in Pakistan which stood between chaos and stability in Pakistan today, and that India's interest and hope for peace in Kashmir lay in a dialogue with the current regime in Pakistan. 

Given the state of relations between India and Pakistan and the fact that they were now nuclear weapon states, Pr.Secy said that there was an apprehension in Europe and North America about the possibility of a nuclear conflict between the two countries. Saying that India had shown, through its pronouncements and actions, that it was a responsible State, he cited as examples, India's policy of 'no-first-use' of nuclear weapons and refusal to engage in a nuclear arms race. India did not want to catch up with China, either in the number of nuclear warheads or variety of delivery systems, since India did not have the resources. India had placed a moratorium, which was not time bound, on nuclear testing and this would continue regardless of whether CTBT came into force or not. As the most important example, he cited the Kargil conflict when India stuck to the policy of not crossing the Line of Control despite the most intense provocation from Pakistan, and had thus demonstrated to the world that it was a responsible nuclear power. While he could not speak on behalf of Pakistan, he said that General Musharraf had been saying since he took over as the C.E.O. of Pakistan, that there was no question of a large-scale conflict between India and Pakistan. Both the countries had said it on more than one occasion. The nuclear factor was beginning to have an impact on the thinking of the two countries and on the danger of a conventional conflict escalating into something more. While one could not guarantee that this thinking had permeated down the hierarchy in the Pakistani armed forces, Pr.Secy said that it had begun to manifest itself.

TdM intervened to ask if it implied that nuclear proliferation was beginning to have a stabilizing effect in Asia? 

Pr.Secy replied that he did not mean to say that proliferation had done this or that. All he wanted to say was that the conduct of India should reassure other countries.

In response to the second part of the question by Mr. Mulye, Pr.Secy said that as one would expect, India had been listening carefully and following Gen. Musharraf s actions since he took over, and added that there was enough contact between the two countries to know what each side was thinking. (though not much of this contact was publicized). When Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was in power, he said, India was told that he was the 'best bet' and that India should come to an agreement with him. Again when Gen. Musharraf took over, India was told by influential countries in the West that he was a moderate man and India should come to some agreement with him. Commenting on the actions of the 'moderate' Gen. Musharraf, he said that he had completely reversed the policies of Nawaz Sharif so far as relations with India were concerned. Nawaz Sharif was beginning to come round to the point of being open to a dialogue on all contentious bilateral matters in order to try and solve them one by one, without waiting for a solution to Kashmir. Gen. Musharraf had completely reversed Nawaz Sharif s policy towards India. He believed that a resolution of the Kashmir conflict was the beginning of good relations between India and Pakistan. Adding that Musharraf had failed on every front in Pakistan - politically, economically and socially, Pr.Secy remarked that Pakistan was today in a political, economic and social mess. The only credit Gen. Musharraf could claim was that he had succeeded in bringing the Kashmir question right in the center of Pakistan's concerns and at the center of Indo-Pak relations. He remarked wryly that this was the 'moderate' man one was talking about. He said that he was speaking among friends and, therefore, hoped that he would not be quoted outside. The present Prime Minister of India was indeed the best bet for a solution to Kashmir. While he was not casting doubts on the patriotism of Mrs. Sonia Gandhi or her concern for India in any way, he said that if in the future, Mrs. Sonia Gandhi came to power, she would have to think a hundred times before taking any initiative to bring peace in Kashmir. The simple fact of her foreign origin would restrain her in whatever action she should wish to take. Pointing out that Prime Minister Vajpayee was more moderate than Gen. Musharraf, he added that Prime Minister Vajpayee wanted peace and had demonstrated through the initiatives he had taken in the last two years his desire for peace in Kashmir. Citing the examples of Prime Minister Vajpayee's initiatives and the responses he had received from Gen. Musharraf in return, he once again posed the question as to who among the two was in reality the moderate man. Prime Minister Vajpayee had visited Lahore and the monument commemorating the creation of Pakistan, and was in turn rewarded by Kargil; he had announced a cease-fire for the holy month of Ramzan and had extended it twice only to be reciprocated by a higher rate of civilian casualty in Jammu & Kashmir. Clarifying that he did not want to give the impression that India had given up, he said that India would continue to tell Pakistan to stop cross border terrorism so that the two countries could sit down and discuss Kashmir in order to try and settle the issue. But Pakistan would not be able to do it by dragging India forcibly to the conference table with a pistol to its head. Both sides could sit down and discuss only when the pistol was removed. 

Referring to Indo-U.S. relations which were growing warmer mainly due to the successful Indian diaspora transforming itself into an influential political lobby, and the 'human bond' factor it had created, Pr.Secy was asked about how he envisaged the emerging Indo-European relationship in the absence of this 'human bond' factor. 

Pr.Secy replied that while the significance of the contribution of the 'Indian Americans' could not be underestimated in terms of its impact on Indo-U.S. relations, it was not the only factor in the improvement in the bilateral relations. Among the various factors responsible for the warmth in the Indo-US relations, were the end of the Cold War, the recognition by USA that it was no longer necessary to maintain parity in its dealings with India and Pakistan, as well as the conclusion that India was a good balance in Asia with its economic liberalization and huge market. All the above factors, he said, had led to a bipartisan consensus in the United States for a new kind of relationship with India. Remarking that this had happened particularly in the last 2-3 years of the Clinton Administration, he added that he had the impression that the Republicans too had a similar perception with regard to relations with India. He said he was very doubtful whether this closeness would lead to any kind of strategic partnership between the two countries, given the fact that USA had its own global agenda and India had its agenda, limited perhaps to the region, but also with regard to international affairs. He expressed doubts on whether there would be complete concordance of views on global issues between India and USA and added that perhaps there would be much more of an understanding between India and France than between India and US. Having said that, he said, the effort on both sides (Indian and American) was to come closer to each other and to try and work out a relationship, which reflected the current reality, unburdened by the legacy of the Cold War. This was already happening and one had to wait and see how far it would go. Excluding the Indian community factor, the other factors that accounted for growing warmth in Indo-U.S. ties held good for Indo-Europe relations too - Europe too saw India as a good balance in Asia; it viewed Indian economic liberalization and reform as good opportunities for interaction between Europe and India; and Europe too regarded India as an emerging important player in economic and strategic matters in the global arena in the coming decades. The same factors operated in Indo-Europe relations but perhaps it would only take a little while longer. 

Maj. Fida Malik from Pakistan Army asked for Pr.Secy's comments on the on-going missile race in the subcontinent between India and Pakistan, and on whether it would be possible for the two countries to co-exist in a climate of good neighbourliness even if a resolution of the Kashmir conflict was somehow achieved. 

Pr.Secy responded that the Indian perception was that Kashmir was not the root cause of the problems between India and Pakistan. It was seen as an important question, or even as a 'dispute', but not as the 'sole' cause of the problem. He added that the fundamentalist outfits in Pakistan (or 'terrorist outfits' as they were called in India) like Lashkar-e-Toiba, Harkat-ul-Ansar, Al Badr etc. said that they would liberate Kashmir first, and then soon after, liberate all the Muslims in India,, which meant Jehad' not just in Kashmir, but jehad against the entire country. Saying that these terrorist groups were being supported in one way or the other by the Government of Pakistan since decades, he pointed out that Gen. Musharraf, after coming to power, had made jehad' an instrument of state policy. It was common knowledge that it was far easier to set up terrorist outfits than to dismantle them. Commenting that we had all seen what had happened in many parts of Pakistan due to the Taliban phenomenon, he added that the Taliban, which had originated in Pakistan, and then been exported to Afghanistan, had today made a return journey to many parts of Pakistan. The question was whether Gen. Musharraf or the collectivity of Generals who ran Pakistan today, were willing or even able to control this extremism, which seemed to be eating away at the vitals of Pakistan itself - politically, economically and socially. Saying that if they were not able to do so, it would have incalculable consequences in the rest of South Asia and Central Asia, Pr.Secy added that one evidence of Pakistan's willingness or ability to control extremism would be to curb cross border terrorism into India. Another proof would be to see if Pakistan would cooperate with the UN Security Council resolution against the Taliban. That, he said, would soon be evident.

In reply to the question on the 'tit for tat' missile race between India and Pakistan, he said that India had a long-term plan for indigenous missile development since the early 80's. Agni, Prithvi, Trishul etc. were part of this two-decade old indigenous programme, and it would continue. He remarked that surprisingly India hardly commented when 'Shaheen' or 'Gauri' was fired in Pakistan, but every time India fired one of her missiles, the whole world seemed to come down on India and accuse it of disturbing the atmosphere. When missiles were transferred from China and Korea to Pakistan (there was irrefutable evidence of that, as was evident from the large number of M 11's owned by Pakistan), nothing had happened and the world had not been able to stop China from supplying them. Pr.Secy referred to the Korean ship headed for Pakistan, which had been impounded in India for carrying spare parts and complete blueprints of missiles, as another case in point. This was unfortunate but true. However, he concluded that if the two countries continued to act responsibly, (he was confident that they would), the situation would not get worse. 

Prefacing his question with the admission that he was asking the same question as he had done last year, Mr. Jean Alphonse Bernard referred to the recent initiatives taken by Prime Minister Vajpayee in Kashmir, and said that something was moving politically in Kashmir. He said he considered Prime Minister Vajpayee as the best hope for a solution in Kashmir, considering the improvement he had brought about in Indo-Pak relations as the Foreign Minister in the Janata Government back in 1977-78, and the fact that he was a staunch champion of Indian nationalism. He appreciated India's courage in maintaining the cease-fire in spite of a lack of response from terrorist outfits, and remarked that Kashmir, however, tended to drag down India's power and prestige in the world. He wanted to know from Pr.Secy what the Prime Minister hoped to achieve by the efforts he had made in the last few months. Given the fact that the situation in Pakistan was not politically conducive, and that not much could be achieved without the participation of Pakistan, he said that some people now expected India to take a bold initiative politically with respect to Kashmir. He wanted to know if Pr.Secy thought that this was the right moment for such an initiative on the part of India. 

Pr.Secy said he hoped that India would not disappoint him in this regard and that India would take necessary steps. He told him that it had already done so for more than a year now, and added that if Mr. Bernard had an occasion to visit Kashmir now, he would find a totally changed atmosphere. Saying that the longing for peace had grown intense today, he added that all the Indian initiatives in Kashmir were intended to respond to this longing of the people - the release of the Hurriyat leaders, the talks with various sections, the cease-fire etc. He said that, unfortunately, there were people who wanted to sabotage these efforts, and added that one could only wait and see how far the Indian Government could go despite the provocations and the killings sponsored by the other side of the Line of Control and the International Border. 

TdM thanked Pr.Secy for the extremely interesting exchange of views, and reiterated his hope that Pr.Secy would visit IFRI at least once a year. 

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