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Evaluation of the European Community's programme of assistance to the West Bank and Gaza Strip
1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1.1 The Mandate
The mandate – Evaluation of the European Community’s Programme of Assistance to the West Bank and Gaza Strip
The general objective of the evaluation is to improve the impact and efficiency of the programme of assistance to the Palestinians. The specific objective is to emphasise strong and weak points in the implementation of projects under B7-420 and to establish the relevance of the intervention strategy.
The study is divided into two general levels :
* Strategic analysis : the study should take into account the political situation and obstacles faced in the implementation of the programme.
* Operational analysis with evaluation of concrete projects in four sectors : Private sector, Infrastructure and Construction, Education and Institution Building.
The evaluation team was composed of four members : a senior economist (team leader), an architect, an education specialist and a junior economist.
The mission was carried out in two steps: (1) July 1998, a week-long desk study in Brussels and the completion of the Inception Report, (2) the field evaluation from 20th August to the end of September 1998.
For the last few years, the economic and social situation of the Palestinian territories has been declining.
* During the period 1992-96 the real GNP per capita has decreased by over 38.8 %.
* Exports have fallen from US$ 1,295 million in 1992 to US$ 631 million in 1996 (a 51 % decrease( 1) ) mainly due to the reduction in labour exports. The number of Palestinians working in Israel has dropped from 83,000 in 1993 (about 21% of the Palestinian workforce) to 25,000 in 1996.
* The Palestinian workforce was estimated in 1996 to be at 548,000 or 20 % of the population. Unemployment rates range from 17 to 34 % and are highly affected by closures.
* The deteriorating level of investments in Palestinian territories, especially in the industrial sector, severely limits the number of jobs available. As substantial numbers of graduates enter the labour force every year, this results in high levels of disguised employment and under-employment.
* From 1996 to 1997, there were substantial variations in real daily wage
declines, with workers sustaining losses of 15.7 % in Gaza, 9.6 % in the West Bank and
those working in Israel 4.4 %. Real daily wages in Israel were, on average, 81.9 % above
those in the West Bank and 124 % higher than those in the Gaza Strip.
International assistance to the Palestinian people has been a supportive and necessary component during the transitional period 1993-1997.
The aim of this assistance is to support the Palestinian Authority and to finance the building of the economy and society in both the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
Table 1( 2) : International Assistance to the West Bank and Gaza Strip, 1993-1997
| Pledges | Commitments | Disbursements | ||||
| Amount Million $ |
% | Amount Million $ |
% | Amount Million $ |
% | |
| Arab Funds and countries | 455 | 12.5 | 444 | 14.7 | 208 | 11.3 |
| EIB | 300 | 8.2 | 90 | 3.0 | - | - |
| European Union | 358 | 9.8 | 358 | 11.8 | 254 | 13.9 |
| European countries | 1257 | 34.6 | 1219 | 40.2 | 692 | 37.8 |
| Japan | 265 | 7.3 | 265 | 8.8 | 231 | 12.6 |
| United States | 500 | 13.7 | 312 | 10.3 | 270 | 14.8 |
| World Bank group | 273 | 7.5 | 261 | 8.6 | 99 | 5.4 |
| Various | 229 | 6.3 | 80 | 2.6 | 76 | 4.2 |
| Total | 3.639 | 100 | 3.030 | 100 | 1832 | 100 |
Since 1993, the European Union's financing has been part of an important economic development programme for the Palestinian Territories. The EU, the EIB and the member states cover about half of the commitments:
Table 2( 3) : Commitments by destination, 1993-1997
The Palestinian Authority faces many challenges and obstacles that hinder development and progress in the Palestinian Territories. These obstacles and challenges have a damaging impact on the economy by stifling private investment. * High incidence of border closures: the total number of days of imposed closure during the last 4 years was 342 days in the Gaza strip and 291 days in the West Bank; 1996 had the highest recorded number of days of closure to date. The total economic losses due to the closures for the period 1993-96 are estimated at about US$ 2.8 billion which is close to the GNP for a whole year and is also close to double the amount of aid received from donor countries within that period; losses can reach US$ 8-10 million per day. * Safe-passage for the free movement of Palestinians and goods between the West Bank and Gaza Strip has still to be implemented. * Airport and seaport allowing Palestinians to operate: construction of an airport( 4 4 / Palestinian Airport was opened in December 1998) and a seaport has still to be allowed. * Restrictions on imports and exports: The limitations on the movements of goods to and from Palestinian Territories and those under Palestinian control create a significant burden on the Palestinian economy. * Increase in unemployment, deteriorated state of infrastructure, lack of natural resources and limits of new administration.
* Infrastructure Development * Institution Capacity-Building * Social and Human Resource Development * Economic Sector Development : private sector growth, agriculture, tourism, and facilitation and provision of soft loans for the private sector. The main objectives followed by the EU financed projects correspond entirely to the needs for economic development of the Palestinian territories and to government decisions. EU financing is very important, not only in absolute but also in relative terms. The scope of the EU’s economic effort is particularly striking when we examine the comparison between the Total Budget Aid 1991-1995 calculated per capita and the economic assistance provided to other regions of the world in the area of the Lomé Conventions and Mediterranean( 5) :
* Construction and infrastructure projects * Assistance to the education sector * Private sector financing * Institutional building However, the evaluation underlines that the positive assessment regarding the overall relevance of the projects is purely subjective. If we consider the economic evolution between 1994 and 1998 (main economic indicators, GNP per capita, employment, exports … evolved negatively) we could conclude that the financing did not influence the Palestinian economic situation. Unfortunately, financing (although the banks can provide it) cannot be the only solution to promote economic development. The main real obstacle to this development results from the lack of a safe-passage for the free movement of Palestinians and goods. We are in a situation of an abuse of prevailing economic standing. Since the West Bank and Gaza Strip enjoy no direct transport and communication with the world at large, other than through Israel or subject to Israeli control, the consequence is an enormous structural dependence of the Palestinian economy on Israel and vulnerability to Israeli Policy. Indeed, whatever the importance, the amount and the nature of financing, it is uncertain whether this will ensure effective economic development as long as the Palestinian economy remains under Israeli control. 1 / By contrast, Israel’s exports had by 1995 grown by 43 % over their 1992 level, nearly doubling in Asian markets opened up as a result of the Peace Process. 2 / Source : Palestinian Development Plan 1998-2000 – December 1997 3 / Source : Idem 4 / Palestinian Airport was opened in December 1998 5 / Source : European Commission for EC Aid Population Division Department for Economic and Social Information and Policy Analysis of the United Nations Secretariat 1996 « World Population prospects in 1996 Revision » |
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General remarks on the evaluation of this programme
* The present situation of the Palestinian Territories is complex: it is a transitory situation from a state of war and revolution, under long and varied foreign rule, towards a state of peace and the rule of law. Since this evaluation took place during this transitory situation, it was considered necessary to carry out a brief sectoral analysis of the main environmental factors.
* It should be noted that the operations to be evaluated are of a quite varied nature: the financial contributions in the area of construction and infrastructure and in the education sector are in fact budget supports. Using a banking expression, we could call this short-term financing. Financial support to the private sector should be considered as a loan because the final beneficiaries will have to reimburse the sum. We could call this medium-term financing which is put in place in anticipation of the creation of a development bank that will be able to raise its own funds. As regards financial support for institution building, particularly so if we include the coming into existence of a democracy we would like to call this very long-term financing.
* The evaluation indicators are different for the various sectors. In the case of the private sector, the evaluation should be based on precise data and on the tendencies over time of each of these indicators. In contrast, the evaluation criteria for institution building are bound to be more of a qualitative nature and subject to personal judgements, which does not imply a lower quality of the criteria. Concerning the other two sectors, evaluation indicators relate mostly to implementation results.
* As a result, the assessments and conclusions presented are based on
sectoral analysis, that are presented in more detail in Chapter 4. The latter contains
also a larger number of sector-specific recommendations.
Status of the programme
Until 1967, 32 branches of banks were operating in the West Bank and 6 in the Gaza Strip. Afterwards, all the banks were closed by Israeli Military Orders. For 20 years, agencies from the four Israeli banks set up a kind of banking system for Palestinians but those agencies had to close because of the Intifada and the boycott launched by Palestinian people.
During the period from 1967 up to 1991, credit agencies, and in particular development institutions were developed. These were usually non-profit companies such as NGOs, whose aim was to provide loans at low rates for local development projects. Foreign donors, Arab and western countries, associations of the Palestinian Diaspora and, in particular, the European Union financed these institutions.
The European Union is the main donor of three credit agencies : ADCC, EDG and TDC. Within the framework of this financial and technical assistance, these three credit agencies were merged in 1996 to form the Palestinian Development Fund. The PDF has a light and decentralised organisational structure with 42 employees. Financing decisions are taken locally and reasonably rapidly.
From 1987 to date, European Union financing reached US$ 34 million ( 6) . One of the PDF’s main objectives is the improvement of the portfolio in order to reach its ultimate objective which is the creation of the first Palestinian development bank, the Palestinian Banking Corporation.
Evaluation.
The results since 1987 demonstrate a striking improvement of performances:
* This financing has permitted investment in 2,095 companies. The financing represents a total amount of US$ 50 million of credits for total investment amount of US$ 162 million.
* This also represents the creation of 2,600 jobs in companies whose total employment is now 7,900.
* Mainly medium sized companies, whose average market value is US$ 24,000 and who employ an average of 3.8 persons, were financed.
* The credit recovery rate has risen from 66% to 95%.
* The investment leverage effect has risen from 55% to 78%.
* The employment leverage effect has risen from 1.1 to 2.8 for the same unit costs.
The improvement of the portfolio puts PDF in the position of reaching the ultimate objective which, is the creation of a development bank. However, aspects of the technical, legal and economic situation have to be considered:
* The average duration of granted credits is still 2.74 years, this is well below the period needed to support an investment.
* PDF lacks liquid assets. In September 1998, PDF granted US$ 6 million in credits, which it was unable to finance. With the monthly recovery of credits totalling US$ 600,000, the customers would have waited ten months. It is, therefore, impossible for PDF to move ahead, either through increasing its portfolio or prolonging the credits.
* PDF lacks a Studies Department (economic feasibility, sectoral and overall economic situation studies).
* PDF has requested Development Bank status from the Palestinian Monetary Authority. This should be approved quite rapidly and the PDF will become the Palestinian Banking Corporation (PBC).
*PBC’s capital will increase from US$ 67,000 to US$ 27 million, by incorporating the EU’s financing. This capital will be owned by Euro-Palestinian Foundation Limited, a Cyprus offshore charity set up for the benefit of the Palestinian people. A board of appointed trustees comprising 5 Palestinians and 3 non-Palestinians will manage this charity. All this should happen before the end of 1998.
Recommendations.
The ascertained evolution of this financing constitutes a model case which could be recommended in identical circumstances and reproduced in the following three large steps:
* From 1987 to 1996, NGOs were financed. At the time there was no other solution. Taking into account the prevailing political context, this financing was risky and the credit recovery rate was only 66%. No bank would have taken these risks and it is fortunate that the EU did this in the shape of a revolving fund.
* 1996 to 1998 marked a stabilisation phase. The set-up of the PDF – which, lacking other possibilities adopted a business company status – permitted the adjustment of the portfolio and the structuring of a financing company.
* This operation is now entering its third phase which is the setting up of a Development Bank. This further step stands a good chance of success, especially if the recommended action is taken.
Considering the different particular phases faced by this project and in comparison with other financing projects to the private sector we have studied, we may conclude that the appropriateness, the relevance, the efficiency, the effectiveness and the impact of the project has been optimum and it is possible to forecast its sustainability with legitimate optimism.
* However, the new bank, PBC, will only be in a position to carry out its function if the following minimum requirements are satisfied:
* Completion of the legal-financial process which is underway.
* The rapid set-up of a US$ 10 million revolving fund account, while waiting for PDF to be transformed into PBC, which could then get external sources of finance.
* Incorporation of the ECU 7 million which the PDF has recently received.
* Establishment of a Work Plan which takes into account the PMA’s prudent rules.
* The setting up of Technical Assistance, financed by a project, in order to create the Studies Department.
* Completion of the internal restructuring process which concerns personnel.
6 / Exclusive of technical assistance and financing to the agricultural sector (ACAD).
Status of the programme
The construction and infrastructure projects form approximately 40 % of the total amount of aid financed by the EU from 1994 to 1998. The projects under evaluation through the present exercise cover a significant range of infrastructure categories for as much as 85 % of the total amount allocated for the sector.
The state of implementation of the evaluated projects is as follows:
* The Municipal Support Programme (MSP) 1 & 2 (25,000,000 ECU)
The programme started in 1995 with a 10 million ECU budget, to which a second phase of 15 million ECU was added. The implementing agency awarded more than 30 contracts for various works in seven selected towns. The programme will come to an end in December 1998, as initially planned.
* The Municipal Support Programme (MSP) 3 (20,000,000 ECU)
Started in 1996 with a tentative list of the projects and an identification mission, at the moment of the evaluation, in September ‘98, the FA was ready for signature.
MSP 3 is following a similar approach to MSP 1 & 2 and is therefore likely to show the same strengthens and weaknesses.
* The Ministry of Education Programme (14,000,000 ECU)
Started in 1996 with the signature of the financial agreement, a first package of 7 out of 22 planned schools was launched in June 1998.
The construction work in progress is at more or less 30%.
* The Temporary Seat Building (5,000,000 ECU)
The project started in 1995 as a part of the MSP 1&2, with a budget of 500.000 ECU.
In September 1998 the financial agreement was ready for signature providing a 5 million ECU budget and a draft architectural design.
* The Gaza Solid Waste (7,085,000 ECU)
The project started in 1993 with the identification and formulation of the project by the European consultant. In 1995 the financial agreement between the EC and the Mayor of the Gaza City Municipality was signed.
In September 1998 the programme was completed within the contractual period of time.
Evaluation
In 1995, the EU assistance for the sector started from the Project Identification Report (PIR) which stated that aid should concentrate on municipal roads, water supply, municipal buildings and possible solid waste and be implemented through the municipalities and by the use of local contractors.
Projects have achieved to provide the beneficiary population with some of those identified infrastructures, as well as additional infrastructures not included in the original list drawn up by the PIR.
The evaluation mission stresses basic concerns that directly affected the effectiveness of the projects:
* The consultant had to carry out additional project identification, detail design and works management to perform the expected high expenditure capacity.
* Higher tribute should have been paid to the training component.
* Time consuming payment procedures brought unexpected negative results to the weak local economy.
* Co-ordination between European Member States, the EC and other major donors seems to be too limited.
The specific context compelling immediate action is reported to be among the causes of the lack of territorial and urban planning, therefore affecting the general coherence between the real needs of the target populations and the infrastructure projects carried out.
The timing and the procedures of the works affecting the efficiency of the implementation are tightly linked to the free circulation of persons and goods, which are outside the control of both the donor and the recipient.
Recommendations
A preparatory interdisciplinary identification & planning exercise should be considered as essential to the suitability of the aid.
EC-Headquarters should foster a clear division and autonomy of the roles, whilst tight co-ordination and reciprocal control should permanently be carried out and should agree on precise procedures both in the beneficiary country and in Europe, and make clear rules well known to all the main actors.
A specific support to donor co-ordination should be incorporated into the programme, with the view of creating synergies for co-operation and co-ordination.
Training and education to public works management and to environmentally friendly design and actions ought to be given major consideration.
The final design of each and other infrastructure should favourably look at the concept of the new durable energetic balance for the life expectancy of it.
The EU, whilst taking the decision to finance such visible projects, ought to provide an example of top quality of a wisely appropriate application of clean technology, promoting the vanguard of new environmentally friendly technology.
Status of the Programme.
Education is the largest sector run by the Palestinian Authority and caters to the educational and employment needs of an estimated 35% of the total population. The EU support for Palestinian self-determination, formally elaborated in 1980 and reiterated on many subsequent occasions, has been expressed inter alia through the provision of assistance to the education sector at all levels, but primarily to the tertian education sector, to which it has been the sole donor.
The higher education sector is composed of 8 universities which grant a Bachelors degree or above; and 16 community colleges which offer 2 year diploma courses, largely in commercial or technical fields.
The universities are young institutions, all of them having been established since the 1970s, and tend to have strong regional identities. Several of them retain close associations with their original founding family. In the 1995/96 academic year, 37,094 students registered. Approximately 42.8% of these were female. The ratio of students to teachers ranges from 10 to 49 students.
From 1978 to 1994 this sector was managed by the Council for Higher Education (CHE). In 1994 with the establishment of the Ministry of Education and Higher Education, the management of the Community Colleges was transferred to the Ministry’s Directorate of Technical Education and Community Colleges. In mid-1996 the entire sector came under the Ministry of Higher Education (MOHE).
Universities are financed from three main sources: tuition fees; funds which come to them through the MOHE and miscellaneous donations and contributions. Until the Gulf War, 1990/91, approximately 75% of the financing came from the Gulf States, and less than 10% from student fees. During the Intifada, as no student fees were paid, the universities depended totally on PLO subsidies.
Evaluation
In 1993 the EC agreed to support, on an exceptional basis, recurrent costs
of the tertiary education sector. Prior to the Gulf War (1990/91) funds were available
from the Arab States, especially Kuwait, through the PLO, for the operating costs of the
Higher Education Sector. EC assistance was provided on the understanding that these costs
would in future be inscribed in the national budget, and that reforms would take place
progressively within the sector. The period 1994-1998 has seen progressive diminution of
funding for this purpose, both in terms of total allocations, and numbers of institutions
supported. The allocation of 4 MECU in 1998 for this purpose represents the final
allocation for recurrent costs to universities. This time period has also witnessed
parallel efforts to enhance not only cost-efficiency and tighter financial planning in
this sector, but also to encourage rationalisation of tertiary education overall. Whilst
this assistance is understood as an exceptional response to an emergency situation, its
importance in maintaining an important element in the fabric of Palestinian society cannot
be over-estimated. The EC also provided assistance to recurrent costs for basic and
secondary education in 1996/97; for school construction, libraries and laboratory
equipment for universities.
Prior to the Gulf War in 1991 the West Bank and Gaza Strip experienced
steady economic growth. The Gulf War resulted in prolonged border closure and expulsion of
Palestinians from the Gulf States with consequent decline in remittances. This war also
resulted in the loss of grants from Arab States through the PLO, including grants for
Higher Education which amounted to US$150 million in 1989. The EC agreed, on an
exceptional basis, to support the running costs and employee salaries of institutions
dependent on the CHE for one year in order to allow these institutions to continue routine
academic activities, to prevent further strikes, and to allow Palestinians to establish a
sound educational administration dealing with respect to running costs on an annual rather
monthly basis.
In 1993 the EU agreed to provide 15 MECU to finance salaries to universities and some community colleges for 1994 through the CHE. Without this support it appears that the sector would have collapsed.
In early 1995 member states agreed that this support should continue at a similar level, on condition that the recommendations of the EC-financed EFFECT report would inform and guide future activities.
Recommendations
In mid 1995 the CHE was advised that EC support for the recurrent costs of tertiary education would be reduced progressively from 15 MECU in 1995 to zero in 1999. At the same time the Commission would consider providing investments during that period to other activities such as libraries & equipment for laboratories.
Whilst it is certainly evident that the larger political and economic environment has not materially improved, and therefore that the premise of budgetary self-sufficiency which was a condition for this assistance has not materialised, there are many indications that the tertiary education sector is being taken more seriously by the PA and that some reforms have been implemented. In the Budget for 1998 which is pending approval, US$ 9 million has been allocated for recurrent costs of the tertiary education sector (as noted earlier the EC has committed 4 MECU for continued salary support in 1998). In principle this allocation of US$ 9 million will also be inscribed in future Budgets of the Palestinian Authority.
In terms of internal reform of this sector, which was also a condition of continuing assistance, it seems that considerable progress has been made although much needs to be done. The achievements can be summarised as follows:
* a unified fee structure has been developed for implementation by all universities
* a unified salary scale has also been developed and adopted by universities
* a Law of Higher Education has been drafted by the MOHE and is pending signature by President Arafat
This law inter alia would help the MOHE to eliminate duplication between universities and
to maximise programmes with societal relevance by providing financial support to only
those universities/programmes it approves and accredits: some universities have
experimented with providing loans to needy students, instead of grants. It should be noted
that tuition fees were raised in 1997 and it could be argued that they could be raised
further for the less needy students.
It is recommended, therefore, that the EC should, as soon as possible, consider giving a positive response to the request from the MOHE (see Letter and proposal Ref: MHE/901/4/2360 of 25/5/98 from Minister of Higher Education to EC Delegation Jerusalem) to support the development of an Action Plan for the Assessment of Academic Programmes, which grew out of the recommendations of the Rationalisation Plan supported by the EC in 1997.
The objective of this exercise would be to generate a series of recommendations on specific rationalisation measures, e.g. consolidation of/or cancellation of existing programmes and the establishment of new programmes; the cost-effectiveness, relevance, scientific quality and viability of existing programmes; to develop this evaluative capacity within institutions, and within the MOHE whose co-ordinating function must be strengthened.
It is recommended that support to recurrent costs of the Higher Education System beyond 1998 be considered only after the Analysis recommended above has been completed. Without pre-empting the findings of this report it is envisaged that any future EC assistance to this sector would be conditional on:
(a) the P.A. initially providing matching funds, which would be increased as the EC assistance phased out progressively on a specific time-scale.
(b) assistance being provided only to accredited programmes of demonstrable quality and societal relevance.
(c ) that the MOHE be strengthened inter alia by the filling of vacant
posts to play a strong co-ordinating and quality control role vis-a-vis institutions of
Higher Education.
Status of the programme.
Four projects are on-going, but three of them have not been implemented (the Palestinian Legislative Council, the Institutional Capacity Building – Ministry of Finances – and Râmallâh Radio). The fourth one (Technical Assistance on Customs Administration) has not started yet.
The Palestinian Legislative ( 3 MECU). For Phase I (1 MECU), the work done by the consulting firm( 7) has not been appreciated. The predicted period ranges from April 1998 to October 1999 with an amount of ECU 2 million. This Phase II will be carried out by another consulting firm. To date, nothing has started except the approval of the Terms of Reference by the parties.
To date, the financial department of the European Commission is holding up the contract with the new consulting firm. The European involvement is lacking when compared with other donors. Due to the delays, the PLC was forced to turn to other donors in order to protect the progress they have so far made towards the establishment of the Council as an effective legislative body. This means that the US took over this central relationship with the PLC. Presently, the project seems worthless and it would be urgent to re-examine the programme shortly. This EU part of the project has reached a point of collapse.
The Institution Capacity Building (Ministry of Finances, 2 MECU). The project consisted of the provision of technical assistance and administrative equipment for the Ministries of Education, Housing, Health, Trade & Economy, Post and Telecommunications and Transport. The goal of the project was to enhance the administrative capacities of the beneficiary institutions in order to provide the Palestinian population with better administrative services. The supply of equipment had to be made through local and international tender, grouping all equipment for the different ministries. For this purpose the European Community selected an International Procurement Consultant to supervise and monitor the tender process in 1996 and the implementation of the entire programme.
To date, the procurement of equipment has not commenced, while the technical assistance project was entirely implemented for ECU 470,000. Regarding the equipment programme, problems of timing and procedure have arisen and have until now impeded the implementation of the programme.
Râmallâh Radio (1.5 MECU). Some significant problems occurred, which delayed the implementation of the project: The PBC is totally controlled by the Palestinian Authority and there is a misunderstanding between PBC of the West Bank and PBC of Gaza. The result that, due to its dependence on the PA, PBC is not allowed to enter the private sector with its activities. According to the European Delegation, it is not worth financing a corporation which practices censorship. That is against the European policy regarding the freedom of expression and media and the support to such activity supposes first that the Palestinian Broadcasting Corporation is effectively independent.
Evaluation.
Though they correspond to the priority need to establish a sound legal and regulatory framework, these three projects are currently frozen due to the different problems of implementation and procedures. We can affirm that there has been no effectiveness or impact, and occasionally a negative image of the EU action has been reflected. Nevertheless, it does not mean that the EU should not follow its support to the institution building.
Indeed, these project ideas often emerged when the new Palestinian Administration was created. The identified needs:
* Have often not been the subject of a precise requirement expressed by the Palestinian Authority but in some cases it was the donor who more or less made the first move.
* These needs, which over the years became more defined, have obviously changed while the projects were in progress, which created some delays.
* The Palestinian administrations under establishment were sometimes unable to submit to procedural requirements of donors which appear complicated.
* The result is that the overall assistance looks like a disparate and scattered programme with intricate procedures.
Recommendations.
Today, after four years of experience, the needs seem to be better and more accurately identified by the Palestinian Administration. Subsequently, we recommend that:
* Despite the difficulties, the commitments be respected and the projects under execution
implemented, even if the Terms of References and/or the initial objectives have to be
modified or re-defined and if the procedures have to be simplified.
* New priorities be defined in co-ordination with the Palestinian Administration, now capable of better defining their needs.
* The new objectives should be targeted in accordance with priorities and not spread among too many projects.
* A certain number of significant principles, which have been defined by the Palestinians, should be expressed through the projects:
* Support to democracy be given. Indeed, we are faced with a transition from a war society to a civil society. This particularly concerns the separation of powers between the Legislative and the Executive.
* Assistance be givento the definition of objectives and means to be initiated by the Palestinians themselves.
These entire actions may require more important means. Of course, these should be led in co-ordination with other donors. These principles define three significant fields of action, some of which are already registered within the current projects but require either a new definition or a reinforcement of means. It regards:
* Support to the Palestinian Legislative Council
* Support to the Customs Administration
* Support to the Ministry of Planning and International Co-operation
In addition, we think that action should be taken in two areas, in order to encourage the ongoing Institution Building:
* Support to professional organisations and in particular to sectoral professional associations. This concerns creating an economic power base which, if its representativeness and its means allow it to function efficiently, could be the basis of economic democracy. This could be an additional and powerful means to make things evolve. We recommend an identification mission in order to determine the needs and the means to promote this important field.
* In the important field of institution building, the co-ordination between the donors has to be perfect and action has to be taken jointly.
There should not be any competition between donors in this important domain, especially since this field is vast and the limits never reached. The donors supplement each other more than they compete. This means putting together resources, know-how and different cultural sensitivities.
7/ Source: Internal report of Palestinian Legislative Council conducted in 1997.
This is the executive summary for the Evaluation of the European Community's programme of assistance to the West Bank andGaza Strip
For more information see: Full Evaluation Report
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